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I.

THE APPRENDI/BLAKELY “REVOLUTION”

The word revolution in the law is frequently overused. Seven
years ago, the United States Supreme Court launched what many
commentators have described as a sentencing revolution with its
1
ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court
held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is
violated when a judge uses facts not found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory
2
maximum.
3
Next came Blakely v. Washington. Blakely pled guilty to a
4
second-degree kidnapping offense involving a firearm. The State
of Washington’s sentencing scheme provided that Blakely should
have received a presumptive sentence between forty-nine and fifty5
three months for this offense. In addition, Blakely had a plea
6
negotiation, which purportedly limited his potential sentence.
The judge, however, sentenced Blakely to ninety months, citing a
Washington statute that allows a sentence of up to ten years if the

† Judge, Hennepin County District Court, 1984–present; Adjunct Professor,
University of Minnesota Law School, 1986–present, and St. Thomas Law School,
2003–present. J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1975. Special thanks to
Laura Taken and Patrick Barrett who helped with this article.
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. Id. at 476.
3. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
4. Id. at 299.
5. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.320 (2000)).
6. Id. at 300.
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judge finds justification for the imposition of an “exceptional”
7
sentence. The judge “found” that Blakely committed the offense
8
with deliberate cruelty.
The facts that led to his sentence were horrific. In October
1998, Blakely bound his wife with duct tape and forced her at
9
knifepoint into a wooden box in his pickup truck. Threatening his
wife with a shotgun, Blakely told their thirteen-year-old son that his
10
mother would be shot if he did not follow them in another car.
Although the boy eventually escaped, Blakely drove his wife all the
way from Grant County, Washington to Montana before he was
11
arrested.
The United States Supreme Court reversed Blakely’s sentence
and held that all facts, other than prior criminal convictions, that
increase a defendant’s sentence beyond what it had been absent
those facts must be presented to a jury and proven beyond a
12
reasonable doubt. In the majority’s view, the right to a jury trial
means not only that the defendant has a right to present a case to
the jury on the issue of guilt, but it also means that a defendant has
the right to have a jury, not a judge, make all the factual findings
required to impose a sentence longer than the recommended
13
sentence under the sentencing guidelines.
Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia stated that Blakely was, in effect, sentenced
for first-degree kidnapping after being convicted of second-degree
14
kidnapping. For this reason, the majority said the defendant was
15
denied the fundamental constitutional right to a jury trial. The
Court did not consider whether the punishment was too harsh; it
only considered whether the decision-making process was
16
constitutional.
[N]othing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi
rights. When a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to
seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the
defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 299–300.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 298.
Id.
State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149, 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.
See id. at 304.
Id. at 307.
Id.
See generally Blakely, 542 U.S. 296.
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consents to judicial factfinding. If appropriate waivers are
procured, States may continue to offer judicial factfinding
as a matter of course to all defendants who plead guilty.
Even a defendant who stands trial may consent to judicial
factfinding as to sentence enhancements, which may well
be in his interest if relevant evidence would prejudice him
17
at trial.
For many, the decision in Blakely crystallized the fears that they
had when Apprendi was decided.
From the bench, Justice
O’Connor read from her dissenting opinion, a practice that was,
for her, an unusual display of disagreement with the majority:
“[T]he practical consequences of today’s decision may be
18
Predictably, shortly after Blakely, the United
disastrous . . . .”
States Supreme Court “remedied” the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines’ Sixth Amendment problem by making the Federal
19
Sentencing Guidelines effectively advisory.
Just this term, the Supreme Court found California’s
20
sentencing law unconstitutional.
California had a three-tier
determinate sentencing scheme that set each term of
imprisonment—lower, middle, and upper—at an exact number of
21
years. The Supreme Court found that this ran afoul of Apprendi’s
22
Because the sentencing law mandated that
“bright-line rule.”
judges impose the middle term unless they found additional
aggravating facts by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court
held that the middle term, and not the upper term, was the
23
relevant statutory maximum. In order to impose the upper term,
the sentencing judge necessarily had to engage in fact-finding that
24
was in contravention of the holding in Apprendi.
II. BLAKELY IN MINNESOTA
An awful lot has been written about the Apprendi/Blakely
sentencing “revolution,” almost all of which has focused on the
right to a jury trial. Blakely, however, stands for much more than

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 310 (citations omitted).
Id. at 314 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 870 (2007).
Id. at 861–62 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5 (West 1999)).
Id. at 868.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 868; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2007], Art. 4
3. BURKE - RC.DOC

1334

4/22/2007 4:25:17 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:4

giving the relatively few defendants who have committed egregious
crimes an opportunity to argue against enhanced sentences before
a jury. It may be that the most important aspect of the revolution is
not the right to a jury trial, but the obligation of those who seek
enhanced sentences to establish their justification beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Although it certainly unnerved a number of people, the
Apprendi/Blakely revolution did not cause earth-shattering change
in Minnesota. In their article, Why Minnesota Will Weather Blakely’s
Blast, Richard Frase and Dale Parent noted:
The [Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines] Commission’s
policy choices—in particular, its decision to approach
guideline development as a policy-making process rather
than an effort to codify past sentencing practices, and its
rejection of “real-offense” sentencing—resulted in
proposed guidelines that lacked several features that
made the federal guidelines highly vulnerable to Blakely
25
attack.
Frase and Parent also noted that the impact of Blakely was
minimized in Minnesota because Minnesota judges never had the
authority to “enhance a sentence based on offenses for which the
defendant had not been charged or for which charges had been
26
dropped.” Likewise, Minnesota prohibits departures based on a
prediction that a defendant might commit an offense in the
27
future.
In the twenty-seven years since the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines’ implementation, the percentage of upward departures
has been relatively small. The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted
“a very deferential standard of review” when considering a judge’s
28
decision to depart from the sentencing guidelines. It appears that
there is not a single case in which a reviewing court has overturned
a trial court’s imposition of the presumptive guideline sentence in

25. Dale G. Parent & Richard S. Frase, Why Minnesota Will Weather Blakely’s
Blast, 18 FED. SENT. R. 12, 12 (2005).
26. Id. at 14 (citing State v. Brusven, 327 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Minn. 1982); State
v. Peterson, 329 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Minn. 1981)).
27. Parent & Frase, supra note 25, at 14 (citing State v. Hagen, 317 N.W.2d
701, 703 (Minn. 1982); State v. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 1981)).
28. See Parent & Frase, supra note 25, at 15 (citing State v. Kindem, 313
N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981)). “[W]e do not intend entirely to close the door on
appeals from refusals to depart. However, we believe that it would be a rare case
which would warrant reversal of the refusal to depart.” Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
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29

favor of an enhanced sentence. While there are certain types of
cases, such as drug cases, that have had unusually high departure
rates, the deferential standard of review has “reinforced the
presumption in favor of imposing the recommended guidelines
sentence and made clear that when unusual circumstances are
30
present, judges are authorized but not required to depart.”
Although the federal circuits and many states have struggled
with post-Blakely litigation, Minnesota has seen most of the
fundamental issues of the post-Blakely sentencing framework
resolved in four decisions by the Minnesota Supreme Court. In
31
State v. Shattuck, the court held that upward durational departures
under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines were subject to Blakely
32
requirements. The court thus rejected all three of the options
33
considered by Justice Breyer in United States v. Booker: (1) totally
invalidating the sentencing guidelines, (2) excision of all provisions
that made the guidelines mandatory, or (3) grafting onto the
guidelines a set of judge-made procedures for a jury trial of
34
aggravating facts.
35
In State v. Houston, the court addressed retroactivity issues,
holding that Blakely is a new rule but not a “watershed” rule
36
requiring full retroactivity. Blakely, therefore, applies to all cases
still pending on direct review at the time Blakely was decided, which
was the case in Shattuck. But, Blakely does not apply to defendants
like Houston whose convictions had already become final.
37
In State v. Osborne, Osborne was convicted on twenty-three
38
counts of drug-related offenses. He appealed, and the Court of
39
Appeals affirmed.
The Minnesota Supreme Court denied
40
review. Soon after, Blakely was decided, and Osborne moved to

29. There are only a small handful of cases where a reviewing court has
rejected a trial court’s downward departure in favor of a guideline sentence. See,
e.g., State v. Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440, 451–52 (Minn. 1999); State v. Law, 620
N.W.2d 562, 565–66 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
30. Parent & Frase, supra note 25, at 15.
31. 704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 2005).
32. Id. at 144.
33. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
34. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d at 146–47 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 246–67).
35. 702 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2005).
36. Id. at 273.
37. 715 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. 2006).
38. Id. at 438.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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reopen the appeal of his sentence for review of an alleged Blakely
41
error. The Minnesota Supreme Court found that Shattuck applied
42
and granted Osborne’s motion to reopen the appeal.
In the
appeal, the State argued that “Osborne [had] forfeited his Blakely
claim for purposes of appeal by failing to raise the claim in the
43
district court.”
The majority wrote that the jurisprudence in
Minnesota has “consistently rejected any Blakely-type claim, holding
that an upward departure from a presumptive sentence does not
present any Sixth Amendment issues under Apprendi, so long as the
sentence does not exceed the maximum sentence authorized by
44
The court noted that it was
the legislature in the statute.”
reasonable that Osborne would not foresee this new rule of law,
especially since it had been consistently rejected by the Minnesota
45
courts. For reasons of judicial economy, it was also reasonable for
Osborne not to object on grounds that the courts had definitively
46
rejected.
The court held that “Osborne did not forfeit
47
consideration of Blakely errors for purposes of . . . appeal” because
the law is clear that a right to a jury trial cannot be waived by
48
silence.
Rather, the court “require[d] that the waiver be
affirmatively made, after a full advisory and a searching inquiry to
49
be certain that it is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”
The
court also found that just as a defendant cannot be convicted of
both a charged offense and a lesser-included offense for the same
criminal act, “the elements of lesser-included offenses under [the
50
pertinent statute] cannot support upward sentencing departures.”
The court further found that “because the factors on which the
upward departures were based were neither found by the jury nor
admitted to by Osborne, Osborne’s sentence was imposed in
51
violation of Blakely.”
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 442 (footnote and internal citation omitted).
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 446.
48. Id. at 442.
49. Id. at 444.
50. Id. at 447 (referring to MINN. STAT. § 609.04, subdiv. 1(4) (2006)). But
the court clarified, in a footnote, that they “do not render a decision on whether
guilty verdicts on lesser-included offenses defined by other provisions of Minn.
Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1, can be used to support upward departures.” Id. at 447 n.7.
51. Id. at 447. Having concluded that Osborne had not waived his right to a
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52

Finally, in State v. Dettman, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that an upward departure based on the trial court’s findings of
aggravated factors, without the express, knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent waiver by a defendant of his right to have a jury make
those findings, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
53
a jury trial. The court held that the defendant’s statements to the
police were not admissions on which the trial court could base an
54
upward departure.
The facts in Dettman, although not as egregious as Blakely,
certainly tested the outer limits. The defendant called the victim,
asking her to “come to his apartment to assist her boyfriend”
55
because he “was in trouble.”
After she arrived, the defendant
“told her that her boyfriend had gone to purchase cigarettes,” so
56
she entered the apartment to wait for her boyfriend’s return. The
57
defendant then tried to cover the victim’s mouth with duct tape.
“When [the victim] fought back, [the defendant] restrained her
58
The
and told her to be quiet or he would cut her throat.”
defendant then made the victim “get undressed and get on his bed
where he penetrated her vaginally with his fingers and put his
59
mouth on her vagina.” The defendant also “ordered [the victim]
60
to sit on his face and urinate into his mouth.” At some point the
attack was interrupted by the Rochester police, who found the
61
victim “naked on Dettman’s bed with blood around her mouth.”
62
The police found the defendant with a knife in his pants pocket.
The trial court inquired as to Dettman’s waiver of his rights
63
when he entered his plea. The judge asked Dettman if he “knew
that there was no agreement regarding what his sentence would be,
and . . . that ‘the actual sentence will be up to the judge’” after

jury trial during the sentencing phase, the court engaged in a harmless error
analysis. Id. It found that “the Blakely error was necessarily prejudicial, not
harmless.” Id. (footnote omitted).
52. 719 N.W.2d 644 (Minn. 2006).
53. Id. at 651, 655.
54. Id. at 655.
55. Id. at 646.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 646–47.
60. Id. at 647.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 656 (Gildea, J., dissenting).
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64

hearing the arguments of both attorneys. The judge informed
Dettman that the defense was free to make a motion for a
departure downward from the sentencing guidelines and that the
65
prosecution could do the same for an upward departure. The
judge asked Dettman if he understood that “‘there are no
guarantees about whether either of these motions would be
granted and it’s possible that you could be sentenced to longer
66
than 144 months.’” Dettman indicated that he understood and
67
that he wanted to proceed with his guilty plea.
The judge sentenced Dettman to 216 months in prison. The
68
presumptive sentence was 144 months. The judge based the 72month upward departure on the particular cruelty with which the
offense was committed and the lasting psychological impact on the
69
victim. With respect to the particular cruelty factor, the judge
“determined” that Dettman: (1) exploited his knowledge of the
victim’s relationship with her boyfriend to lure her to Dettman’s
apartment; (2) subjected the victim to multiple forms of
penetration; (3) planned and prepared for the assault by
precutting the duct tape that he tried to use to silence her; and (4)
70
ordered the victim to engage in especially repulsive acts.
In fairness to the trial judge, it was not until Dettman’s appeal
was pending before the Minnesota Court of Appeals that the
71
United States Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington. The
trial judge was therefore not in a position to know that an express
waiver of a jury determination was necessary. The principal issue
decided in Dettman was whether the defendant admitted to certain
facts used in sentencing as part of his guilty plea and therefore had
waived his right to claim that only a jury, not a judge, could
72
determine the existence of aggravating factors.
The prosecution contended that Blakely does not require an
express waiver of the right to a jury determination of aggravating
sentencing factors before a defendant’s admission may be used to

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 656–57.
Id. at 657.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 647 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
See Dettman, 719 N.W.2d at 647–48.
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73

enhance his sentence.
The majority opinion written by Chief
Justice Anderson noted that “several federal courts of appeals have
upheld upward sentencing departures based on facts admitted at a
sentencing hearing, a plea hearing, or in a plea agreement, without
requiring an express waiver of the right to a jury determination of
74
aggravating sentencing factors.”
Nevertheless, the Minnesota
75
Supreme Court held that an explicit waiver of Blakely is required.
Chief Justice Anderson stated:
We believe our approach is preferable to that of the
federal circuits because our approach more appropriately
takes into account long-standing principles regarding a
defendant’s waiver of his jury-trial rights. We agree with
the Colorado Supreme Court that a waiver requirement
“furthers the central goal of Blakely, which was to correct a
system ‘in which the defendant, with no warning in either
his indictment or plea, would routinely see his maximum
sentence balloon from as little as five years to as much as
76
life imprisonment.’”
77
Justice Laurie Gildea and Justice Alan Page dissented. In her
dissent, Justice Gildea stated, “Every federal circuit court of appeals
has indicated that sentencing courts do not run afoul of Blakely or
the Sixth Amendment when they rely on a defendant’s admissions
78
of fact in sentencing.”
Curiously, she wrote, “Even though
Dettman is arguing that a ‘right’ based on the U.S. Constitution has
been violated, the majority dismisses the federal cases without
79
discussion, and relies instead on certain state cases.”
While reasonable minds might differ as to how explicit a
waiver of Blakely rights should be, the fact is that Minnesota has also
not followed federal law with regard to waivers in other areas. For
80
example, in State v. Spann, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that any agreement between the prosecution and a defendant that
73. Id. at 649.
74. Id. at 653 (citing United States v. Pittman, 418 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir.
2005); United States v. Monsalve, 388 F.3d 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Saldivar-Trujillo, 380 F.3d 274, 279 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Lucca, 377
F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2004)).
75. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d at 655.
76. Id. at 653 (quoting People v. Isaacks, 133 P.3d 1190, 1195 (Colo. 2006)).
77. Id. at 656.
78. Id. at 659 (Gildea, J., dissenting) (referencing United States v. SaldivarTrujillo, 380 F.3d 274, 279 (6th Cir. 2004)).
79. Id. at 659.
80. 704 N.W.2d 486 (2005).
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requires the defendant to waive all rights to appellate review in
exchange for a reduced sentence was invalid as a matter of public
81
policy and violated the defendant’s right to due process. Justice
Page, who wrote the opinion in Spann, said, “We recognize that a
majority of other jurisdictions have held that allowing a defendant
82
to waive his right to appeal is not inherently illegal or unfair.”
Justice Russell Anderson, the author of the opinion in Dettman,
dissented in Spann, stating that he would have sent “the matter to
the district court for a more comprehensive inquiry as to the
83
validity of Spann’s waiver of those rights.”
Historically, Minnesota courts have strictly construed the
requirements for allowing a defendant to waive his or her right to a
84
jury trial. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure state that:
The defendant, with the approval of the court may waive
jury trial provided the defendant does so personally in
writing or orally upon the record in open court, after
being advised by the court of the right to trial by jury and
85
after having had an opportunity to consult with counsel.
Approval of waiver by the trial court is discretionary and can only
be made where the court finds that the defendant was informed of
86
his or her rights and that the waiver was, in fact, voluntary.
Finally, Minnesota courts are adamant that a defendant personally
waive his or her right to a trial and disallow waiver by the
87
defendant’s attorney.

81. Id. at 494–95.
82. Id. at 491 (referencing State v. Perkins, 737 P.2d 250, 251 (Wash. 1987);
United States v. Nave, 302 F.3d 719, 720 (7th Cir. 2002)).
83. Id. at 495 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
84. See State v. Ulland, 357 N.W.2d 346, 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.01, subdiv. 1(2)(a)–(b)).
85. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.01, subdiv. 1(2)(a); see State v. Neumann, 392
N.W.2d 706, 707–09 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting a defendant’s waiver even
though the defendant received a group advisory at his first hearing and a mailed
advance notice of a non-jury trial).
86. See State v. Pietraszewski, 283 N.W.2d 887, 889–90 (Minn. 1979); Gaulke v.
State, 184 N.W.2d 599, 602–03 (Minn. 1979).
87. See State v. Tlapa, 642 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); State v.
Sandmoen, 390 N.W.2d 419, 424–25 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). But see State v. Ford,
276 N.W.2d 178, 183 (Minn. 1979) (“While we intended to make it clear that the
waiver should be by defendant, not by his counsel, in this case defendant was
present [in court] when his counsel made the waiver and defendant may well be
said to have ratified the waiver and made it his personal act.”).
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III. BLAKELY AND DETTMAN: MOVING FORWARD
88

If State v. Dettman represents the culmination of the structural
89
sentencing framework in Minnesota created by Blakely, where does
the revolution go now? Certain issues seem obvious. First, how will
appellate courts in Minnesota review Blakely departures? Second,
how will lawyers present arguments and evidence in departure
cases when the issues are less well-defined, such as those factors
cited by the trial judge in Dettman? Third, although Minnesota
does not, as a matter of law, consider evidence of diminished
capacity as relevant in the guilty phase of a trial, would that same
standard be true if the evidence was offered to negate a departure
fought by the prosecution on grounds similar to those advanced in
Dettman?
Before Blakely, the question in Minnesota on appellate review
was whether the trial court was justified in departing from a
90
presumptive sentence.
In the post-Blakely era of jury
determination of the facts for sentence enhancement, appellate
courts will face new issues. For example, one appellate issue is
whether the jury’s finding of an enhancement factor had a
sufficient factual basis—akin to sufficiency of evidence for guilt. A
second appellate issue is whether, even if the jury verdict is
supported by the evidence, the discretion of the judge is still an
issue in determining whether the district court properly applied its
discretion in deciding to depart based on the jury’s findings. A
third issue is whether appellate courts will, for the first time, begin
to examine the justifications for sentencing to the presumptive
sentence but count the ends of the allowable range.
The essence of the justification for the departure in Dettman
was cruelty. But what is “cruelty” under Minnesota sentencing law?
When judges alone were determining cruelty, Minnesota courts
made little attempt to define the term, and a variety of appellate
court opinions held that there really was no standard for making
91
92
this determination. In Holmes v. State, the court concluded that
the departure for cruelty was unjustified because the conduct was

88. 719 N.W.2d 644 (Minn. 2006).
89. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
90. See, e.g., Ture v. State, 353 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Minn. 1984); State v. Blue
327 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Minn. 1982).
91. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584, 589–90 (Minn. 1996).
92. 437 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1989).
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not significantly different from that typically involved in the
93
commission of that particular crime. The court held in State v.
94
Hanson that a departure for cruelty was not warranted because the
defendant did not commit manslaughter in a manner significantly
95
96
more serious than a typical manslaughter. In State v. Bicek, the
97
defendant’s wife and child died in an explosion. He was charged
with first-degree murder but convicted of second-degree culpable
98
negligence manslaughter. At the State’s request, the trial court
departed upward, but the appellate court reversed, holding that
particular cruelty was not applicable to a reckless offense that is not
99
intended to harm.
When determining whether a departure is warranted, the
“core issue” for a trial court is “whether the defendant’s conduct
was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in
100
the commission of the crime.”
In a system where the jury
determines the existence of aggravating factors, a whole range of
fundamental issues are brought to the fore. For example, “the
void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a . . . statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
101
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”
Due process requires that criminal statutes provide explicit
standards for those who apply them in order to prevent arbitrary
102
enforcement.
A statute is unconstitutional when it “delegates
basic policy matters to . . . juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
103
discriminatory application.”
Definitions of aggravating factors
that are left entirely to the imagination of the jury will create a
significant issue for appellate review of the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines’ applications.

93. Id. at 59–60.
94. 405 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 1987).
95. Id. at 469.
96. 429 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
97. Id. at 290.
98. Id. at 290–91.
99. Id. at 291–92.
100. State v. Thao, 649 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2002) (citing State v. Back, 341
N.W.2d 273, 276 (Minn. 1983)).
101. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
102. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
103. Id. at 108–09.
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“Cruelty” is a term that can be defined differently from one
juror to the next. “When a jury is the final sentencer [sic],” the
United States Supreme Court requires juries to be “properly
104
instructed regarding all facets of the sentencing process.”
In
105
the United States Supreme Court
Maynard v. Cartwright,
determined that the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”
aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague when given to a
106
sentencing jury without further definition.
Similarly, the
107
Supreme Court in Godfrey v. Georgia overturned a defendant’s
sentence because the aggravating factor at issue—whether the
crime committed was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman”—did not give the jury guidance concerning the statute’s
108
109
meaning.
In Walton v. Arizona, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the Maynard Court’s holding that the bare terms of the aggravating
factor were facially vague and further stated that in the context of
sentencing by a jury, the vagueness problem could be fixed by
110
applying a constitutional limiting instruction.
In Walton, the
Court ruled that the use of the aggravating factor was constitutional
because a judge, rather than a jury, was determining whether the
111
factor existed.
The Court reasoned that “[t]rial judges are
presumed to know the law and apply it in making their
112
decisions.”
To date, there have been relatively few Blakely sentencing jury
trials. If there is a norm, it is that defendants are far more likely to
waive a jury trial for purposes of sentencing than they are to waive a
jury trial for purposes of determining guilt. The fear is that issues
such as particular cruelty or that the offense is more serious than is
typical require context. Presenting context to a jury is not easy.
Will the parties be able to call expert witnesses? And if so, who
would they be? Would the parties be able to introduce departure
reports of other similar cases?

104. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990); see also Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427–28
(1980).
105. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
106. Id. at 363–64; see also Walton, 497 U.S. at 652–53.
107. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
108. Id. at 428–29.
109. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
110. Id. at 653.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Another potential question is raised when juries are
responsible for determining aggravating factors beyond a
reasonable doubt. The court must determine the permissibility of
evidence that is not directly related to particular cruelty, but might
mitigate a jury determination in favor of departures such as the
defendant’s diminished capacity. On the issue of guilt, Minnesota
113
does not recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity.
The
114
court in State v. Bouwman stated that allowing the use of this
doctrine would “inevitably open[] the door to variable or sliding
115
scales of criminal responsibility” where the law “requires a final
116
In
decisive moral judgment of the culpability of the accused.”
117
State v. Provost, the court, in a pre-Blakely world, criticized the
doctrine because it “seeks to make the punishment fit the crime by,
in effect, changing the crime (or at least by transferring the
118
sentencing function from the judge to the jury).”
At the sentencing phase, however, Minnesota juries might
consider a defendant’s diminished capacity in determining
whether an upward departure is justified.
The Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines provide that if a defendant “lacked
substantial capacity for judgment” because of a “mental
impairment,” then such impairment may be used as a mitigating
119
factor. In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in State v.
120
Wall that while the existence of a mitigating factor does not
require a downward departure, it “[cannot] properly be ignored”
121
when departing upward.
In that case, the defendant strangled
122
his wife while she was apparently sleeping. The trial court viewed
these circumstances as an aggravating factor because the defendant
123
“preyed upon the reduced physical capacity of the victim.”
The

113. State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 1982).
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 88 (D.C. 1976)).
116. Id. at 706 (citing Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir.
1945)).
117. 490 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. 1992).
118. Id. at 100.
119. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY II.D.103(a)(3), available at http://www.msgc.state.
mn.us (follow “Guidelines” hyperlink; then follow “Sentencing Guidelines and
Commentary (Revised August 01, 2006)” hyperlink).
120. 343 N.W.2d 22 (Minn. 1984).
121. Id. at 25.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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Minnesota Supreme Court, however, rejected the trial court’s
finding because the defendant clearly “lacked substantial capacity
124
for judgment.”
Alexis de Tocqueville once said, “In a revolution, as in a novel,
125
the most difficult part to invent is the end.” State v. Dettman may,
at least for Minnesota, be the end of the structural debate of how to
implement the Apprendi/Blakely sentencing revolution. Minnesota
will require explicit waiver of a jury, just as it does with jury waivers
on issues of guilt. Where the rest of the sentencing revolution ends
is unclear. Among the things we do not know is how the attorneys’
sentencing presentations will unfold before juries, nor do we know
how appellate courts will review them. That part of the sentencing
revolution is yet to be invented.

124. Id.; see also State v. Sanford, 450 N.W.2d 580, 587–88 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990), petition for rev. granted, (Minn. Feb. 28, 1990), order granting rev. vacated
(Minn. Mar. 22, 1990) (stating that aggravating factors justify upward departure,
even if defendant’s mental illness was mitigating factor); State v. Stephani, 369
N.W. 2d 540, 550 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming upward departure where court
specifically found the defendant did not “lack substantial capacity” for judgment).
125. STEPHEN M. WALT, REVOLUTION AND WAR 331 (1996).
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